WZ Smith and JZ Smith
Our past two readings, by WC Smith and JZ Smith deal with the word "religion" and it's adequacy and inadequacy in defining the breadth and depth of human spiritual phenomena. WC traces the etymology of the word, starting with the Latin "religio" which he translates as piety or ritual action. WC contends that it was not until modernity that the word came to take on the connotations that we currently utilize. As such, he rejects religion as a thing in itself and suggests that scholars instead attempt to define religious phenomena as "faith" or "piety." JZ Smith eschews the etymology of "religio" and instead traces the discourse of the word "religion."
He begins by asserting that religion is a word that scholars and intellectuals ascribe to a set of human behaviors and beliefs, and then traces the development of what specific behaviors and beliefs have been called "religion." He also asserts that religion is an anthropological category. This is done mostly through a comprehensive list of books written on comparative religion, starting with the early explorations of the Americas and the observance of "pagan religion."
Unlike WC, JZ has no real coherent thesis outside of the fact that the word religion serves as a useful horizon for religionists in attempting to define the objects of their study.
I found that WC Smith's article was both more entertaining and more thought provoking than JZ's. While I recognize that WC focuses on a very western construction of religion and that the word "religio" is not the only source for our modern conception of religion, I feel like he does make a very valid observation that the word "religion" as we currently understand it is insufficient for defining what we use it to define. I also agree that there may not be such a thing as "religion" as it is understood as a universal concept that can be divided into discrete units. As for JZ, I found his article unremarkable. He did not present any ideas that I found novel or noteworthy, and I was confused as to what point he was really trying to make. Perhaps I will be illuminated in class.
(On JZ Smith, he essentially takes a functionalist approach, saying that the word "religion" carries whatever connotation that we ascribe to it. He also wants religionists to be aware that they operate from a specific (read: Western) schema and that this schema affects how we view other expressions of religious activity around the world.
EB Tylor and JG Frazer
Tylor and Frazer propose a theory that religion arises out of primitive magic and animism. In their theory, primitive peoples associate performing certain acts or rites with events in nature, and that by performing this magic, they can force the natural world to do this or that. The theory is developed to say that religion arises out of these ideas of animism and magic when the primitive peoples realize that their magic is not working, and in an attempt to explain why, decide that nature is controlled by capricious gods who can only be swayed by prayer/sacrifice/etc., but not controlled through spells.
First off, from what I read, the "research" in the Golden Bough would be insufficient for a wikipedia article, much less a modern academic paper, that said, I think that Tylor makes a very good point in that ancient religion was science. It was an attempt to explain how the world worked with the knowledge available. But, that's about where my agreement with the two men ends. Both Tylor and Frazer seem terribly dated with their concept of intellectual evolution. The language they (please note that "they" mostly applies to Frazer, as we didn't really read anything Tylor wrote) employ is almost offensively imperialistic and pejorative. He seems to imply that the primitive peoples faculties for reason were insufficient, and in fact compares them rather frequently to "dullards," ignoring the fact that many ancient societies were able to create very elaborate calendars, sophisticated irrigation systems, and even well reasoned moral codes -- not to mention beautiful works of art and literature. It also fails to at all address the phenomena of religious experience and the personal encounter with the divine that most religious people claim to have.
I think that they start off on a good path, with religion as a primitive science, but it's ultimately derailed by, quite frankly, racist imperial notions of moral/intellectual evolution and a complete disregard for the personal spiritual experience found amongst religious peoples. I also find that neither men seems to address the religious systems that existed in their times and how they relate to the primitive
WEB DuBois and Sigmund Freud
WEB Dubois analyzes religion specifically as it relates to the American black community. He claims that the black church serves a social function that creates a place where an ostracized group can come together and function as a community. He also claims that this began when the nature of American chattel slavery disintegrated the traditional family life of slaves.
I think Dubois raises interesting points about the role of religion in the black community. However, he is so functional and so specific, that his analysis fails to really be any sort of theory on religion, rather it is a mostly sociological idea.
Freud posits that religion arises from some primeval memory of the "first sacrifice," where primitive man killed and ate their patriarch in a fit of jealousy. Feeling remorse for this act, they imposed totems and taboos on themselves, affectively reinstating the father-figure they so despised. He also states that religion in its current incarnation comes from the need for humans to feel safe in a hostile environment. By projecting the idea of a loving and protective father figure into existence, humans can more easily cope with the trials of life.
Freud's analysis, much like Frazer and Tylor, relies on the construction of a rather fanciful narrative to have any real merit. As it stands, there does not exist any real evidence of Freud's "cannibal savage" much less any evidence of some sort of universal primeval memory in humanity of the "first sacrifice." Also, he seems to contradict himself when he claims that religion originated out of an ambivalence to the father figure but now exists because of an attempt to recapture the love and feeling of security received from the father by a child. Also, Freud seems unable to distinguish between the individual and society. His claim that ancient humans were to moderns as children are to adults is laughable and likely a product of Victorian bias more than any sort of scientific enquiry.
Karl Marx
In the most basic sense, Marx's theory on religion resembles Freud's. Religion is a harmful illusion that needs to be removed for humanity to advance. Marx reaches this conclusion through a very detailed and expansive interpretation of humanity and human history, tied chiefly to economics. Religion is an expression of the alienation that the oppressed worker feels. Through religious activity, the oppressed is able to take comfort in future promises of heaven, punishment for the wicked, etc. Since Marx's ideas require action, religion is a hinderance because they do not move the worker toward revolution.
As far as the theorists that we have studied who use a historical narrative to explain religion, I think Marx's is actually the most internally consistent and convincing. However, Pals ably points out several contradictions in his theories. He failed to address some that I would like to point out, that I feel deal more directly with Marx's views on religion that Pals' critiques did.
First, by making the claim that there is some sort of insurmountable narrative to history, that the proletariat must eventually act to overthrow the ruling class, Marx is asserting what one can only justifiably call an illusion. Marx may think this is the way things operate, and he may be able to back up this idea with some evidence, however, barring this revolution actually happening, it is only reasonable to call his idea an illusion.
Secondly, by even positing that there is this inescapable economic fate, I think that Marx succumbs to what he accuses Hegel of. Turning economic revolution into an unavoidable truth gives it an existence outside of the material world. By making an idea an absolute, it seems that one naturally deifies it.
Lastly, if all thinkers naturally aid the ruling class, where does Marx fit in?
Emile Durkheim
Like, Freud and Marx, Durkheim uses a reductionist philosophy when approaching religion. He attempts to explain religious phenomena in light of Sociology. For Durkheim, religion is inseparable from the sphere of sociology because religion itself is the veneration of society.
Durkheim rejects the individualistic claims of the other religionists that we have studied and instead posits that all aspects of human culture have arisen through a group structure. In his narrative, religion did not come from the solitary primitive philosopher, rather, it grew out of a tribal dynamic.
He says that most primitive peoples separate all of life into two categories, sacred and profane. The sacred is venerated (and represents what Marx might call the superstructure) and the profane (everyday individualistic stuff) is to be kept apart from the sacred.
Like Frazer, Tylor, and Freud, Durkheim bases most of his claims on the study of Totemism in Australia. He claims that the primitive peoples who venerate the totem, don't actually venerate the totem itself, but that it is a symbol for something greater. Durkheim calls this something greater the "totemic principle."
The totem is also a symbol of the tribe.
Durkheim then proposes that since the totem is the symbol of the tribe and the totem also represents the totemic principle, then the totemic principle is therefore the tribe.
In short, society and God are one and the same.
Through this, Durkheim asserts that one can explain the entirety of religious phenomena as manifestations of a worship of society.
I admired Durkheim's dedication to a scientific approach to his theory and was actually following him for most of the way (while be aware that he was only studying one specific peoplegroup) until he decided that the totemic principle was inherently society. I don't quite understand how he drew that specific conclusion. I understand his theory well enough up until that point and then when working under that assumption, but the leap that God (or divinity or what have you) is some sort of manifestation of devotion to the tribe doesn't make much sense to me.
Apart from that, I have the standard issues with Durkheim that I've with most of our recent guys. Too reductionistic, scientifically dubious, relies on a constructed narrative, narrow in research but broad in application, and doesn't really account for the individual religious experience or the depth and breadth of human religious experience across the globe.
Max Weber
Weber, like D, approaches religion from the perspective of a sociologist. Unlike D, he believes that religion exists as an entity that exists both separate from and entwined in society. He postulates that purely religious motives can have an influence on society. The example that he uses is the "protestant work ethic." He claims that capitalism developed out of the protestant reformation. First, by declaring all work vocational, Luther allowed laity to see their everyday labors as religious activities. Then, when Calvin introduced predestination, success in the religious activity of business became a way that one could determine their salvation. Weber postulates that success in business functioned as an ascetic movement within society, where believers built up wealth through traditional religious observances of temperance, thrift, and restraint. Coincidentally, this proved to be an excellent way for obtaining wealth and modern capitalism developed.
He claims that religion is a feeling (I forget his exact wording, but it was very similar to D's "effervescence") that the individual experiences that brings them into a different (and ostensibly better, since the individual seeks out this feeling) plane of reality.
He claims that religious sentiment develops differently for different people (I should state, that Weber stresses the individual much more than D). For the rural farmer, religious sentiment may arise as a way of overcoming the hardship of working the land and everyday foibles. For the intellectual, religious sentiment allows them to imbue their life with meaning, rather than succumb to some sort of existential nihilism.
I like what I have read of Weber so far. He does kind of talk himself into a hole in regards to his attempts to make valueless judgments, but the fact that he is aware of this bias is a huge leap forward from some of his contemporaries. I have to confess that my lack of issue with W probably stems from my existing beliefs. I think he is right to posit that religious sentiment is something that exists separately from society, and therefore I am less likely to try to poke holes in his argument. It seems perfectly reasonable to me that men can do something purely from religious motivation.
His explanation of why men are religious also is more in line with my own belief, if a little bit reductionistic.
This is probably my most positive reaction to a theorist so far, but that is probably because he has been the most complimentary to religion so far.
Of course, my ambivalence toward his writing may not arise purely from my religious stance, but also from the fact that his worldview of valueless observation corresponds most readily with the post-modern intellectual environment that I live in. I think that for a good post-modern, to be reductionist is a sin, so it's possible that I may disapprove of some of the other theorists regardless of my religious principles.
Mircea Eliade
Like Weber, Eliade attempts to construct a theory of religion that does not succumb to the reductionist tendencies of some of the other writers that we have studied. For Eliade, one must study religion on the terms of its practitioners, it cannot be reduced to a manifestation of economics, psychology, anthropology, etc. Religion has to do with humanity's encounter with the sacred (the transcendent and supernatural) and the race's desire to experience the sacred feeling as frequently as possible.
This begins in the archaic religions with the use of symbols that are manifestations of the sacred idea. The rock as the sacred as eternal and unchanging. The moon as the sacred as constantly renewing. He also states that archaic religion is mainly the desire of the worshipper to return to the original and perfect divine state, or paradise.
He then goes on to say that out of Judaism, there arose the idea of the sacred at work in history. This allows the
worshipper to expand their conception of the sacred to include all things, because God is present at all moments and in all places.
Once again, I find myself agreeing with the more post-modern view of Weber and Eliade that we must confront religion on its own terms. However, I feel like Eliade does not do as good of a job as Weber in describing religion as a "thing in itself." I feel like by linking the sacred to specific places and objects he doesn't really delineate between his idea and the totemism that runs rampant in the Victorian religionists. He also suffers from parallelomania.
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